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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA KAY CLARK, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
CECIL E. CLARK, 
Case No. 971635-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Plaintiff") submits the following as her 
opening brief in the above-referenced appeal: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITIES 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order of the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, and U.CA. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(h). 
1 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and order of the Third District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving a common law marriage and divorce. 
A Declaration of Marriage and Decree of Divorce was issued by trial court Judge Dennis 
Frederick September 29, 1997. The Defendant/Appellee Cecil E. Clark appealed that matter, 
which case is presently pending with this Court as Case No. 970635-CA. Subsequent to that 
appeal, Mr. Clark filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Order Nunc Pro Tunc. On August 31, 1998, the trial 
court granted the Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Stay and to Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce and an Objection to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal. These matters 
were resolved by Order of the trial court dated December 24, 1998, which is the final 
judgment and order being appealed to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the Plaintiff's Motion 
for Entry of Order Nunc Pro Tunc, which would have validated the Declaration of Marriage 
and Decree of Divorce which was being challenged by Defendant based on lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to violation of the time provisions in the common law marriage 
statute? 
2. Did the trial court commit error in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Stay 
and to Supplement Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and the 
2 
allowed a divorce trial on alternate theories set forth in the original Divorce Complaint in this 
matter, other than the common law marriage theory? 
3. Is the one-year tin le limit ii i the common law marriage statute set forth 
at U.CA. § 30-1-4.5 urn.-H1^national? 
tiRMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Appellant sets fortl i in the attached Addendum, the complete code and rule 
provisions referenced as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (common law marriage statute and one-year filing 
requirement) 
I ,.![•. Constitution, Artie1" T. Section V. Addendum 12^ 
I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 'Vmrt mi ist review the trial court ' s interpretation. < / ,,//. * . .n :nn, 
§ 30-1-4.5 (1995 as amended) and Utah Constitution, Article I, under a correction of error 
standard, V - i v J ' TT1 ^V- Appellate Cour t s "correctness" means Mi<u r- •- particular 
deterei ice is gi> • c: j i tc tl it z t i ial ; : : \ in I: s i i ilii ig c >i i qi iesti- ,)i is ;/ I ' la ' Sii ite i ' ! < >.m if, 8 ( :»9 I " 2d ( )32 
(Utah 1994). 
This Court must review the trial court 's interpretation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 30 4(a) 1, tl ic: • n w : r ,„ o tu i .< ' stati itc , am: ic 1 i i ilii igs ; >i I I M a i l itiff s n ic itic >i is. I n ider ai i abi ise <: )f 
discretion standard. 1 rial c< n irts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters, absent 
manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Crockett v. Crockett, 
836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff submits the following as summary of the case and refers to the relevant 
facts, as needed. A more detailed Statement of Facts is set forth in the Brief of Appellee 
Linda Kay Clark filed in a companion appeal to this case, Case No. 970635, and those should 
be incorporated herein by reference. 
A. General Background. 
1. The parties to this action had an 18-year solemnized marriage, which 
ended in divorce granted by the Third District Court of Summit County on August 27, 1985. 
2. The parties resumed living together in October 1985, returning to their 
previous marital home in Coalville, Utah. They later moved to a home in Magna, Utah, 
where they lived together until their separation approximately 11 years later. The trial court 
found that the separation of the parties on August 28, 1996 represented the formal termination 
of their common law marriage. (Addendum 1, Findings of Fact). 
3. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce alleging that the parties had 
a common law relationship and that the assets and property of the parties should be awarded 
on an equitable basis. She also requested that the marital estate be divided pursuant to 
common law principles and, alternatively, under the theories of partnership, contract for 
services or trust. (Addendum 2, Verified Complaint for Divorce, para. 6). 
4 
4. / 
Frederick who entered Findings that the parties met the legal requirements for a common law 
marriage, including: the parties being of legal age and capable of giving consent; the parties' 
cohabitation from IVOJ unui ivvo; tl le mutual assumption of marital rights, duties and 
obligations; and the holding ou: t^  husband and wife and having acquired a general reputation 
as sai i ie. I 'ai 1: v f tt le specific e v idei ice < >i 1 will lid i tl le Cc 1 ii t i i lade tl: lese findings inch ide tt le 
following: 
(a) The parties filed ;ont —rrnrd income **-v return* from. 1985 through 
1 ! 
(b) After an 18-year solemnized marriage, the parties were divorced and 
resumed living together only two months after their divorce and 
cc »1 iabite< 1. cc >ntini u n ish thereaftei fc >i a perioc 1 of appn \ "-. •* a 
years; 
(c) Flail itiff kept tl ie i i lai i iec 11: lai ne c >f Clark, and IV It Clai k pui cl lased a set 
Gf wedding rings for her in 1989; 
(d) The parties established several business together, which they operated 
jc 'in itly, ai K 1 I"1 i ti s Clai k ( • • : u I ;:e( 1 c J it a fi ill t ime t >asis in these bi isinesses 
do ing bookkeep ing , payroll , and other office work wi thou t be ing paid 
a formal salary; ai id 
(e) The parties established and maintained joint bank accounts, credit, and 
purchased real property together. 
5. On August 13, 1997, at the close of trial, Judge Frederick made lengthy 
and specific Findings of Fact and a ruling determining a common law marriage existed. 
(Addendum 3, Text of Bench Ruling). A lengthy Minute Entry reflects the finding and ruling 
of the Court. 
6. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Declaration of Marriage 
and Divorce were prepared by Plaintiff's counsel and sent to opposing counsel on August 26, 
1997. Changes were requested by counsel and revised copies were sent September 10, 1997 
for approval and were never returned and no objection was filed. A transmittal letter to the 
Court for review and entry of the documents is dated September 26, 1997. (Addendum 4). 
7. The Findings and Declaration of Marriage were entered September 29, 
1997 by the Court. (Addendum 1). 
8. Earlier in the proceeding, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Decree 
and related documents pursuant to the ruling of Commissioner Lisa A. Jones at a hearing held 
April 17, 1997, arising from Defendant's delay in providing discovery after two motions to 
compel and the Commissioner's ruling that his pleading should be stricken and default 
entered. (Addendum 5, Commissioner Jones' Ruling). 
9. A hearing was held June 30, 1997, before Commissioner Lisa A. Jones, 
where she stayed Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Decree and ruled that discovery be provided 
the next day. The proposed Declaration of Marriage and Decree of Divorce were filed in the 
record unsigned. 
6 
g Mr. Clark's Appeal. 
Defendant Cecil E. Clark filed an appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals 
on October 28. 1997, on two issues: the first, whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter 
the c »i ( i e r < k c :laring the i narriage of these parties because the oi der was not entered within one 
year of the termination of their relationship, as required by the common law marriage statute; 
based on the evidence at trial. 
11
 "Hie above-referenced appeal was consolidated into this appeal as Case 
• iei : I" tl i :' "I Jtal i Coi n t • :>f \ ppeals e •iritc: i • = .d Feb i mi y 24, 1999. 
C. Post-Appeal Motions Before the Trial Court. 
12 Mr Clai: k filed a Motion fri dismiss for I ,ack of Subject Matter 
11 irisc li :ti« : n i ai K 1 Me i i ioi andi n i: I. : i I I\ !a;; ] , 1998. 
13. I laintiff Linda Kay Clark filed a Response and Memorandum of Points 
an. > * a 
Motion to Enter Order Nunc Pro Tunc on June 3, 1998. Both Motions were heard before the 
trial i >urt ;• Asgust ?1. 1 0 ^8 . At the close of argument, the trial court granted the Motion 
1998 hearing). 
1 1 <i ii September ] 0, 19< )8, Plaintiff fih :d a Motion ^ v and to 
Supplement Findings of Fai i nd P; IT; r 
to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal. Mr. Clark filed no response to either of 
7 
these Motions and pursuant to a Notice to Submit for Decision, the Court ruled by Minute 
Entry that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay was granted, and that Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement 
and to Object to the Order was denied. (Addendum 7, Minute Entry Ruling). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the request of Plaintiff 
to enter the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Declaration of Marriage Nunc Pro 
Tunc to the date of trial, August 13, 1997, rather than the actual date of entry, September 29, 
1997. The nunc pro tunc statute states that a court must simply find "good cause" for 
granting such an order in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment. 
Since granting of the request would have merely corrected a technical violation of the 
common law statute and would have validated the findings and ruling of the Court, it was 
error to find that good cause was not shown. 
2. The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the 
Findings and Declaration of marriage in this case. This pleading acknowledged the Court's 
ruling that the common law marriage claim was invalid and requested a determination and 
division of assets based on alternate grounds set forth in the original Complaint, such as 
common law principles, equity, theory of partnership, contract for services or trust. Similarly, 
Plaintiff's Objection to the Order Vacating the Decree and Order of Dismissal asserted that 
the ruling to dismiss the underlying action was overly broad and that the Court should 
proceed under the alternate theories to make an appropriate evaluation and division of joint 
assets. The Court denied these requests without comment or findings. 
8 
3. This Court should find that the one-year provision of the common law 
marriage statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the case before the 
Court. The application of the time limit creates arbitrary classes without any rational basis 
for such discrimination. This Court should find the one-year provision of U.C.A. 
§ 30-1-4.5(2) unconstitutional and affirm that the facts in this case support a finding of a 
common law marriage which meets the other elements of the statute. 
4. The trial court erred in interpreting the common law statute to bar entry 
of the Findings and Order in this case beyond one year, based on a reasonable reading of the 
statute and on the theory of estoppel. Plaintiff's ability to comply with the one-year time 
limitation in the statute was substantially prevented by the conduct of Mr. Clark, who should 
not be allowed to gain from this misconduct. 
MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE 
In marshalling the evidence herein, Plaintiff submits that there is only one 
significant fact and ruling to present. That is the fact that Plaintiff did not meet the clear 
technical requirement of the common law marriage statute by not having the Declaration of 
Marriage and Divorce Order entered on or before August 26, 1997, which was one year after 
the termination of the marriage, as found by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS 
FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER, TO SUPPLEMENT FINDINGS AND DECREE, 
AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ORDER VACATING DECREE. 
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A. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant Plaintiff's Motion to Enter Order 
Nunc Pro Tunc. 
This appeal is from a final Order of Trial Judge Dennis Frederick involving a 
common law marriage and divorce. The parties in this matter had a 29-year relationship. 
The first 18 years were pursuant to a solemnized marriage which ended by divorce in Summit 
County in August 1985. A few months later the parties resumed living together, which they 
did continuously until their separation in August 1996. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint for 
Divorce requesting that the parties find a common law marriage existed and, alternatively, 
that the assets of the parties be divided based on alternate theories, including common law 
principles, the theory of partnership, contract for services or trust. Plaintiff filed her 
Complaint on September 20, 1996, and the Court held a one-day trial August 13, 1997. At 
that time, a bench ruling was made finding that the parties met the legal requirements for a 
common law marriage set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. (Addendum 8). The trial 
court made detailed findings referring to a long course of conduct and many categories of 
evidence which met the required statutory elements. Mr. Clark filed an appeal to this Court 
challenging the establishment of a common law marriage, and raising the question of the trial 
court's jurisdiction based on the entry date of the Order and the one-year time deadline in the 
common law marriage statute for the Court to make a determination of marriage. 
After the appeal was filed, Mr. Clark returned to the trial court and filed a 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction based on violation of the one-year time filing 
provisions in the common law marriage statute. The Plaintiff brought a motion to enter the 
10 
Declaration of Marriage and Decree of Divorce as a Nunc Pro Tunc Order under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4(a)-l, which provides as follows: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause 
and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an order nunc 
pro tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal 
separation or annulment of marriage. 
The Court heard both motions on August 31, 1998, and granted the Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction. This appeal followed. 
The Court erred in not granting the nunc pro tunc motion of Plaintiff. The 
statute requires only a finding good cause, which Plaintiff has unquestionably shown in the 
circumstances of this case. The Findings and Order of the trial court establishing that a 
common law marriage existed for at least 12 years prior to August 1997 show that Plaintiff 
met all substantive requirements of the common law marriage statute. Detailed Findings were 
made as a bench ruling and subsequently a Minute Entry, on the date of trial, August 13, 
1997. In those Findings, the Court made the required statutory finding that the termination 
of the marriage occurred on August 28, 1996, when the parties separated and Mr. Clark 
changed the locks on the residence and Plaintiff relocated. The final Findings and 
Declaration of Marriage and Divorce were entered by the trial court September 29, 1997, 
about four weeks after the trial and thus one month beyond the one-year time limit of the 
common law marriage statute. The relevant portion of that statute at U.CA. § 30-1-4.5(2) 
is as follows: 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship described 
11 
in subsection (1) or within one year following the termination of 
that relationship. Evidence of the marriage recognizable under 
this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
(Addendum 8). 
The Utah nunc pro tunc statute requires only a showing of good cause for the 
Court to enter an Order concerning marriage or divorce on a nunc pro tunc basis. Good 
cause is certainly present in this case, given the Findings and Ruling of the trial court on the 
existence of the common law marriage in this case. By failing to grant the Nunc Pro Tunc 
Order, the Court ignores traditional principles of equity and fairness by relying on a technical 
matter. The existence of the nunc pro tunc statute and its specific application in the area of 
domestic relations law is tailor-made for a situation such as this. These parties have come 
before the Court after a relationship of 29 years, nearly one-third of which was in a common 
law status, and Plaintiff seeks assistance in dividing the substantial marital estate. The ruling 
of the Court leaves Plaintiff without a remedy under the common law statute, which can be 
easily corrected by the entry of the order in this case, nunc pro tunc. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
After the trial court ruled that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
rule on the issue of common law marriage, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Stay and to 
Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. This pleading 
requested that the Court stay enforcement of the dismissal based on failure to meet the 
common law marriage requirements pending a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals on this 
12 
appeal and the previous one filed by Mr. Clark. That Motion to Stay was granted by the 
Court. 
Plaintiff also requested that the Court hold an additional hearing or allow 
briefing to supplement the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
entered in this case September 29, 1997. The Plaintiff had filed a Complaint for Divorce 
which requested a finding of common law marriage and which also requested a determination 
and division of assets based on equity, common law principles, the theory of partnership, 
contract for services or trust. Based on the taking of evidence which occurred August 31, 
1998, the Court had sufficient evidence to make rulings under these alternate theories. The 
findings made by the Court established that the parties had contributed to the purchase of one 
another's vehicles, real property, personal property and business interests. It was reasonable 
that the Court supplement the Findings and final Order entered in this matter to consider and 
rule on the alternate theories which were properly pled in this case. Based on the evidence 
already of record, it would be likely that Plaintiff would be entitled to a distribution of assets 
and property currently under the control of Mr. Clark. 
Mr. Clark made no response to this Motion and despite the fact that it was 
unopposed, the Court denied the Motion by Minute Entry on October 16, 1998. Again, the 
ruling of the trial court effectively deprived Plaintiff of any remedy for the division of jointly 
acquired assets and was an abuse of discretion. Trial courts are allowed to exercise broad 
discretion in divorce matters unless there is "a manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a 
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah App. 1992). 
13 
It is also well settled in Utah appellate law that to ensure that a trial court acts appropriately 
in discretionary matters, that the reasons for the Court's decision must be set forth fully in 
appropriate findings and conclusions. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court herein 
utterly failed to provide any findings for this ruling. 
The failure of the Court to allow Plaintiff an opportunity for hearing or briefing 
on the alternate theories requesting equitable division of assets is clear error. After the trial, 
the trial court was fully informed of the extensive businesses and properties acquired during 
this lengthy relationship, and of Plaintiff's financial need. The Court awarded Plaintiff 
alimony of $1,000 a month, attorneys' fees, and one-half the marital estate encompassing all 
property accumulated during the relationship. This property included a paid-for residence, 
a cabin, two rental properties, cash value in life insurance, businesses and bank accounts. All 
these assets were in the control of Mr. Clark. Failing to allow Plaintiff a reasonable 
opportunity to address division of assets under alternate theories was a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
Utah law supports a division of assets under such alternate theories under many 
varied circumstances. An example is the case of Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 
1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1983 (Utah 1992), where the parties resided in a "marriage like 
relationship" from 1980 to 1984, when they were ceremoniously married and prior to their 
divorce action in 1989. The trial court made a property distribution of all assets acquired 
during the relationship and not only during the period of marriage. This was challenged on 
14 
appeal and the high court upheld the discretion of a trial court to allocate property acquired 
by prior to and after the solemnized marriage. The Court stated that to do so, it was 
important to categorize the property as premarital or marital and that the Court must first 
"find unique circumstances that warrant disregarding the general rule that premarital property 
is separate property." Utah trial judges have been given the broad mandate to make equitable 
divisions of property in domestic relations cases pursuant to statute, U.CA. § 30-3-5, and case 
law. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). It has been stated that the purpose of 
property divisions is to allocate property in the manner which "best serves the needs of the 
parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 
1373 (Utah 1988). The Burke case sets forth a detailed list of factors for the Court to 
consider in making a property division. In Walters, the trial court stated the general property 
division rules and added that "where unique circumstances exist, a trial court may reallocate 
premarital property as part of a property division incident to divorce." 
Another example is the case of Layton v. Layton, 111 P.2d 504 (Utah App. 
1989). This case involved a couple who held themselves out to be husband and wife for 
many years and were never legally married. They raised four children, worked full-time in 
a family business, titled property in cotenancy, although in separate names. The wife sued 
for divorce in 1983 and later amended her Complaint to add a claim for partition. The trial 
court found that a common law marriage existed, even though the Complaint was filed four 
years before the commencement of statute. The Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the 
trial court and found it had mischaracterized the relationship as a marriage. The decision 
15 
cites with approval alternate theories on which to base an equitable division of property 
accumulated by unmarried cohabitants such as a finding of partnership, contract for services 
(citing Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977), and Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 
(California 1976)), and/or a trust (citing Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), In Re 
Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah App. 1982)). 
Another example is the case of Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah 1988) 
involving a common law wife bringing an action against the common law husband's estate 
for declaration of rights and distribution of property. During their relationship, these parties 
cohabited and jointly paid the mortgage on real property from funds in a joint account. After 
her husband's death, the common law wife continued living in the real property and paying 
the mortgage and filed a legal action alleging the common law marital relationship to secure 
her interest in the property. The trial court concluded that equitable principles should be 
applied to the marriage-like relationship and awarded her the residence. On appeal, Plaintiff 
argued the court should find a constructive trust. Although denying her request, this well-
analyzed opinion suggests that the equitable theories of constructive trust or resulting trust 
doctrines would apply. Plaintiff specifically argued this alternate theory in the current case 
and, based on the ruling of the Court, has been denied an opportunity to present evidence and 
briefing on that theory. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs Objection to Order Vacating 
Decree and Order of Dismissal. 
After the ruling of the trial court finding lack of jurisdiction to enter a common 
law marriage, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal. 
Denial of this Motion was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. At the hearing held 
August 31, 1998, where the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss, no specific findings were 
made and only the granting of the Motion to Dismiss was specifically stated. The Order, as 
prepared by Respondent's counsel, vacated the Declaration of Marriage and Decree of 
Divorce in an overbroad and inappropriate fashion. The affect of dismissing Plaintiff's claims 
under the common law marriage statute should not result in a dismissal of the entire case. 
Rather, it only results in the trial court being able to make findings and a ruling under the 
common law statute. The other claims pled by Plaintiff in her Complaint concerning alternate 
theories of property division and principles of common law and equity should be unaffected 
by that jurisdictional ruling. 
The appropriate scope of the Order arising from the August 31, 1998 hearing 
should be only that the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction under the common law 
marriage statute is granted. Plaintiff should have been allowed to proceed with a hearing and 
briefing on her alternate theories. The denial of this Motion by the Court substantially 
prejudices Plaintiff and leaves her without a remedy for a division of property and support 
claims. 
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D. The Bad Faith of Mr. Clark Should be Considered in Review of the Plaintiff's 
Motions and Under Equitable Principles. 
During the pendency of this litigation, the Court made specific findings on 
several occasions that Mr. Clark acted in bad faith. Plaintiff submits he should not be 
allowed to benefit from this misconduct. The fact that the Trial Judge was fully aware of this 
misconduct and addressed the bad faith in his ruling favors Plaintiffs request to have 
equitable principles applied in this case. During the litigation, Mr. Clark failed and refused 
to produce discovery which impeded and delayed the litigation. Plaintiff separated at the end 
of August 1996 and filed her Complaint the following month on September 20, 1996. She 
filed an Order to Show Cause requesting temporary support and a finding of common law 
marriage, which was heard by the Commissioner on November 7,1996. The Commissioner's 
Minute Entry notes that an evidentiary hearing is required for a finding of common law 
marriage and reserves the issue for trial. (Addendum 10). Plaintiff objected to the ruling and 
requested an evidentiary hearing but the trial court denied a hearing and reserved the common 
law issue for trial. Plaintiff then served discovery October 16,1996, and after waiting several 
months filed a Motion to Compel on January 31, 1997. No discovery was provided and a 
second Motion to Compel was filed March 20, 1997. The Commissioner held a hearing April 
17, 1997, and entered an Order that inadequate discovery was provided and provided 10 days 
for compliance or Mr. Clark's pleadings would be stricken and his default entered. This 
Order on second Motion to Compel Discovery Responses was signed and entered by Judge 
Frederick on April 30, 1997. (Addendum 5). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Decree 
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and Findings, an Affidavit of Jurisdiction and Grounds for Divorce and Proposed Findings 
and Decree on May 15, 1997. Mr. Clark filed a Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment 
May 21, 1997, and a hearing was held June 30 before the Commissioner where she made no 
recommendation on the request for declaration of marriage, ordered discovery and tax returns 
to be provided within 10 days, and again suggested that a bifurcated hearing on the issue of 
common law marriage take place based on the closeness of the statutory one-year 
requirement. (Addendum 10). 
The above history shows that Plaintiff was extremely prompt in filing her 
Complaint and discovery requests and in requesting enforcement of the discovery sanctions. 
When the Court finally ordered complete discovery and tax returns to be provided June 30, 
1997, discovery had been delayed eight months beyond the time it had initially been 
requested. This resulted in substantial detriment to Plaintiff in trial preparation and, in fact, 
denied her the opportunity to present a complete case at the time of trial. This chronology 
shows clearly that the delays were the result of Mr. Clark's actions and not those of Plaintiff. 
A hotly disputed issue at the time of trial was the status of the marital residence 
on Jefferson Road in Magna, Utah, that both parties resided in that home until separation and 
which was fully paid for. From the time of purchase in 1988 until June 1996, a few months 
before separation, the home was titled in the sole name of Plaintiff. A written agreement was 
made in 1992 to transfer the home to Mr. Clark, based on a series of payments. Minimal 
payments were made until June 1996, when Mr. Clark made a balloon payment and obtained 
a Quit-Claim Deed. At trial, Plaintiff asserted that she entered into this agreement under 
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duress and pressure from Mr. Clark and that it was never intended to be a true agreement. 
The Court found Plaintiff's claims of duress and intimidation by Mr. Clark credible and found 
clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff was pressured and the trial court voided that 
transfer. This episode shows the knowledge of the trial court of Mr. Clark's bad faith and 
intimidation in the relationship, as well as in the course of litigation. Despite this knowledge, 
the trial court refused to apply equitable principles and allow Plaintiff the opportunity to 
obtain a fair distribution of jointly acquired property. 
II. THE ONE-YEAR REQUIREMENT IN THE UTAH COMMON LAW MARRIAGE 
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The Utah common law marriage statute at U.CA. § 30-1-4.5 contains two parts. 
Section (1) sets forth four factual elements which must be established for the Court to find 
a common law marriage. The second section (2) states that the determination or 
establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described 
in subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship. Appellant 
challenges this language as violating the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution 
(Article I, Section 11) because on its face it constitutes an arbitrary and unjustified 
deprivation of the right to adjudication. Appellant also challenges this statute as 
unconstitutional as applied in this case, since it forecloses Plaintiff's rights to an adjudication 
of a common law marriage through no fault of her own. 
A critical case in reviewing this issue is Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 
(Utah Court App. 1995) where this appellate court held that the language requiring a 
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within one vea:. i:. Bunch rhe Utah Court of Appeals held that the statute's plain meaning 
required a "determination' • -: .Kuudieation" within one year of the termination of the alleged 
common law i " f ' - • ' ^ '' ' o ••* .^v 
had been solemnized and no order under the common law statute had been entered. The trial 
coi 11 t ( lisn lissed the Coi npla.ii it aftei tv • c ) eai s because tl le one-year pen .: • >_•- .. 
4.5(2) had expired and the party seeking to establish the marriage had not complied with the 
statute. In its opinior. f(u • airt of Apprab' did note that S-vtion *2) ^f the statute might 
presei it a :: ; »i istiti; itior 
not that a Petition or Complaint be filed within that period. The Court stated a party could 
timely file a petition for determination and still not comply with the statute if the Order were 
not entered within the o-"-- * :••• •' " ' I 
A. The Statute Violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution by 
Depriving Plaintiff of Any Means to Redress Injuries. 
q * .• , . 
under the "open eourt^ prnMsmnot tiu 1 tali i ori^itntirn, \r' cle I, Section ' \-Amch reads: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law. which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay: an-. *a- •• . > >\irud -r^in 
prosecuting or defending before am iribunai -s\ this stau by 
himself M? oiunsel \r •, ix i 1 caust u* whvh h- •*. -, p:u\\ 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking a remedy for rights accruing to hci b\ 
of a marriage-like relationship and asked the Court to equitably divide marital property and 
address her support needs. The right to apply to courts for redress of wrong is a substantial 
right and application of the one-year time limit to Plaintiff's case herein violates her rights 
of due process and access to the Courts. Similarly, this Court has found unconstitutional a 
limitations provision in the Utah Product Liability Act which barred actions without regard 
to when an injury occurred and was not designed to provide a reasonable time within which 
to file a lawsuit. Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1986). The time 
limitation in the common law marriage statute deprives Plaintiff of a remedy which violates 
this constitutional provision. 
B. The Statute Violates Article h Section 24 of the Utah Constitution by Violating 
Plaintiff's Rights of Equal Protection and to be Free of Discrimination 
The one-year time limit also violates the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 24, which states: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The 
Utah Supreme Court has held this provision to be analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution by stating as follows: 
Although their language is dissimilar, these provisions embody 
the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should 
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). See also, Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 
1993). The Lee court explained that for a law to be constitutional under Article I, Section 24, 
it is not enough that it be uniform on its face, "what is critical is that the operation of the law 
be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if 'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated 
similarly' or if 'persons in different circumstances' are 'treated as if their circumstances were 
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P i *  • " 1 11 ide i 11:1: ii:1 ; ai ial) sis, \ • ;::;1: 1: 11 1st 1 e > - i v > 1:1 le coi 11:11:1 : 1 1 la * <;r 1 1:1,1:1:1: 1 iage la • 1: ::: Jeteri: nine 
first, ii it applies equally tc ) all persons within a class; and second, whether the statutory 
classification and 1;.. •jnu-rent treatment given tl le classes are based on (..ik-rences that 
reasonably further the objectives of the statute. These cases hold that it is unconstitutional 
to single out one person or group of persons from among the larger class on the basis of 
1 i v < .** -
is either a rational basis standard or can be a higher standard of judicial scrutiny if a 
fundam.en.tal riebt is at issue. Arguably,, the right to marry is such a fundamental right. 
1 . •• 
basis approach stating as follows: 
Under the rational basis, or least restrictive standard, a statutory 
classification is constitutional unless it has no rational 
relationship to a legislatively stated purpose or, if not stated, to 
any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose. A presumption 
of constitutionality is extended h- statutes . . . anJ. Mint 
presumption is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a 
classification created by the statute unless the classification 
creates an invidious discrimination, or bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Moreover, the 
presumption requires a court to presume that the classification 
was intended to further ihe legislative purpose. 
L if at 580 Tl: i : pei atic 1:1 :t :. f 1:1: 1 : ,: :., 1 IIIII: i 1, :; ::i: 1 l a < n: larriage • >ne-yeai tim : • lin: lit • :::i: eate s 
unreasonable classifications. One group can obtain judicial determination, of their common 
la:v\ mai 1: iage w it! iii :i >:n.e year' and ai ic >ther year cannot obtain this determination. 1 Here is no 
essential difference between these classes when they begin the process. It is thus reasonable 
2,3 
to ask whether the discriminatory treatment accorded these classes withstands constitutional 
scrutiny. 
As stated by the Court of Appeals in the Bunch case, there are many reasons 
why a common law marriage determination may not be completed within one year. Simply 
the process of discovery, intervening motions and litigation tactics can easily delay a domestic 
law case and prevent a final order being entered within one year of filing. A common law 
situation is even more problematic, as the parties may be disputing the date of termination 
of the relationship which may not even have a final resolution until the trial and ruling of the 
court, which could be well beyond the one-year time bar had expired. Additionally, it is 
unusual for a case to be resolved by summary judgment or other intervening, final order 
which could establish the marital relationship in a short-term, summary hearing without a 
complete trial. In the case at bar, Plaintiff sought a determination of the marriage before the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner on at least two occasions and the ruling was reserved for 
trial based on the need for an evidentiary hearing, which the trial court refused to grant earlier 
than trial. In Plaintiff's case, she also suffered from the litigation tactics of Mr. Clark in 
delaying discovery for eight months from the time it was first requested. She filed two 
Motions to Compel with the Court and a Motion for Entry of Default and that pleadings be 
stricken. Moreover, at the end of the case, Plaintiff prepared and filed timely Findings and 
Proposed Order which were sent to opposing counsel, as required by the rules. Counsel 
requested revisions, which were made, and ultimately the documents were signed and entered 
by the Court one month after the one-year time bar. Plaintiff had no choice but to follow the 
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expired Augus t 26 , it would have been nearly impossible for Plaintiff to comply wi th 
prepar ing and present ing final documents to opposing counsel and to the Court within the 
stall it n: \ time • frame • 1 1 lis element of ti ial tactics and bad faith by an c >pposing part) was 
unfairly ignored by the trial court when. Plaintiff asked for her nunc pro tunc n ;hng and 
present*. . . . . . *,;. : • , . : . u . . . . .. • .. . : 
procedures of the Com t ii i this case and the Domest ic Relat ions Commiss ione r ' s process of 
hearing all preliminary matters before the T i a l Judge reviews them, resulted in per iods of 
c • ] . 
Plaintiff has attempted to discover the legislative history of the c o m m o n law 
marr iage statute to determine the legislative objective in this law A ntah iaxv Review note 
r ".• in ' e • flc >oi debate ai M 1 cc n lcli ic iei ; tl m t 1:1 le li ^ *'•* "• ... 
c o m m o n law marriage statute was as a cost-saving measure to curtail welfare abuse. 
Apparent ly , w o m e n and .; ,,:• . *.!... *, ...ui:. :,•>: ^ L i i a x p-. i..fits even v ,xx:: tnc\ v.v-nai IK;U 
wi th an employed domest ic partner whose resources were not counted. Passing a c o m m o n 
law n larriage statute would close this welfare loophole as well as remedy the inequitable 
^ ' : I I I L -!v v h * * " \ t i -Sv d 
employees . L uui Law Rc\icw7 Volume 1988, N<.». i7 p . 2"??\ I ins Law Review commenta tor 
also suggests that the one-year t ime bar is ambiguous and unclear as it does not define what 
couple declares that they are terminating their marital relationship but continue to cohabit and 
2 5 
meet the requirements of the statute for more than a year after that termination, can they still 
validly establish a common law marriage? Similarly, a strict interpretation of the one-year 
time bar may result in a termination of the relationship when any one of the five statutory 
conditions ceases to exist. Even a third scenario, a liberal view, holds that if each of the 
statutory conditions has existed at some time in the relationship, then the conditions once met 
are forever satisfied and the court is not precluded from establishing the marriage, regardless 
of when the order is issued. To adopt this view without making the time limit meaningless, 
a court would have to focus on one or more of the five conditions, such as cohabitation, as 
representing the "relationship" whose termination would trigger the one-year period. Id. page 
277, note 19. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 
1994) stated that the legislative history of the common law marriage statute indicates it is 
clearly a codification of common law marriage principles. Significant in that legislative 
history is the interpretation that once a common law marriage has been found to exist by a 
court or administrative order, "it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes." Id. at 793-
794. There does not appear to be any specific history on the reasoning behind the one-year 
time bar other than to venture a guess that it is to be a limitation on stale claims and to allow 
a certain amount of closure in an important personal area. Against these possible legislative 
purposes, this Court must measure the disparate treatment of different classifications which 
inevitably occur as the statute is applied. Plaintiff submits that there is no rational 
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classifications which result. 
I .. \p|a«,i^ vY>urt cannot \..tc. .; rational rasis for such disparate treatment 
or disci HM;I.!uoii, then the one-year time bar must be deemed arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
This Plaintiff's view" of the application of the one-year time bar is that it is merely fortuitous 
i . i 
any reasonable legislative purpose. Plaintiff, such as the one at bar, is thus denied reasonable 
access to legal remedies for reasons entirely beyond, her control. This Court should find the 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should j . ! : . - the one-year \in\< i ! i ;;; u. the 
c • • - • * ^titutional. Further, this Court should find the trial 
court's denial of Plaintiff's Motions tor Nunc Pro Tunc Order, to supplement the pleadings, 
and UMicctior . \ .u^i^g ::u Decree as abuses of discretion w hich inequitably deny 
Plaintiff's access to a !•••.*•!! 'vnidv in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 'z day of Ji;h, 1(>Q9. 
SUZANNE M A R E L I U S 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
UTTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 53l-0-o5 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
LINDA KAY CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CECII E. C I A..E K, 
Defendant 
DECLARATION OF 'MARRIAGE AND 
DECR EE OF DIVORCE 
2 7. \ S ° 7> 
vo - I, 17 
£ % 2 2> c-^ 
Case No.: 964904,144
 A,A 
Judge:J. Dennis Frederick 
Fhe above-entitled matter came before the • our: !. : trial on August, 13, 1,997, the 
I lonorable J. Dei inis Frederick presiding. I Vlaintiff A as pi esei n: in pei son and represented by 
counsel, Suzan ne Marelius. Defendant was present in person, and, represented by counsel, Dean 
,.dt)iL>Kie * wi. -,^urt received and approved, the . .......ation »f the parties that i n the event 
a Declaration of Marriage is made, that the marital assets would be jointly appraised and the 
parties would enter binding arbitration, to divide marital assets,,, On, the issue of whether a, 
common law marriage existed, the Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received evidence, 
reviewed the ' Court file and, record herein, a nd having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conch isions of I a,11 v ai i„c 1 goo< 1 < :ai lse ; ippearii lg therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The above-named parties are hereby declared married effective October 1, 1985, 
having met all elements to establish a common law marriage pursuant to UCA §30-1-4.5. 
2. The Plaintiff has established grounds for divorce from Defendant pursuant to 
irreconcilable differences and Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce to become final upon 
entry. 
3. The written Agreement entered between the parties dated June 26, 1992 pertaining 
to a division of equity in the marital residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah 
84044, is hereby declared null and void. The Quit Claim Deed signed by Plaintiff, pursuant to 
that Agreement transferring her interest in this residence to Defendant, dated April 10, 1996, 
is hereby set aside and declared null and void. This residence is a joint marital asset of the 
parties. 
4. The Plaintiff is awarded alimony payable by the Defendant in the amount of 
$1,000.00 per month September 1, 1996. Alimony will be paid by the 1st of every month 
payable to Plaintiff until such time as she remarries, cohabits, until alimony has been paid for 
a term equaling the length of the marriage of the parties, or until Plaintiffs death, whichever 
event occurs earlier. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for alimony accumulated during the pendency of 
this matter between September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997, in the amount of SI2.000.00 
to bear interest at the legal rate of 7.45% per annum until paid. 
2 
6. PlaintP 
with the above-entitled action. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to subm.it an Affidavit of Costs and 
. ;._„nt may 
respond or object accordingly. The Court will determine the amount of fees and costs pursuant 
7. The parties are ordered to select a mutually agreed upon appraiser to establish tin1 
current value of all marital property including the real estate and businesses established during 
the marriage, i ' - * * • i 
select a mutual!) agreed upon mediato: or arhitiarm : ('\er^ec ;he diminution n; mania; 
pi Dpei ty. ' I he pai ties ai e t :> joii itl; ' pa> fc r tl lis ai bitratioi 1 ai id are to cooperate in good faith 
ii 1 that process. 
8. 1 1 le Coi n it finds tl lat the marital estate is encompassed by all property, of every 
nature, accumulated either in the sole or joint names of the parties during the term of their 
cohabitation from October 1, 1.985 through, the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce. The 
Court finds that this property includes but is not him - ' ' /••:;.: -• " - . . 
the heating, cooling ana insulation businesses operated n\ the Sciendum the manial residence 
on "7492 West Jefferson Road, Manna, llKili ill ml il uioprit, n l\1*i Smith >nn Hi-i 
Draper, Htalr -ha fmi: p!c> icnta! property at .^ b()7 South ^2.^ Y\V \^ W i \ \'alle\ C "it\ , 1 tab: 
me nan ^ • "h a ca^h \ aim1 on 
(he lil'' «-' Rohrria Harr . the a:oAmobile- -wneelers, and vehicles consisting of 1988 Lincoln, 
199.s . . •.. les; the wedding rings purchased by 
3 
Defendant for Plaintiff; the bank accounts and any and all other assets purchased by both parties 
during the designated time. 
9. The parties are to cooperate as needed to sign titles, transfer property, and to do 
other things needed to effectuate the terms of this Decree and implement the Court orders 
herein. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to return to.her maiden name of "Hammond." 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
_.:'u:•>•_• J u; :v mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
I.ARATION OF MARRIAGE AND DECREE OI JJI\ ORCE, this >£? day of 
^~^ZL_- V?n, to: 
v.:. i>-,1 \ N. Zabriskie 
Jamestown Square 
ll'inover Building, Suite 370 
3507 North University Avenue 




Th ire* J-,T;C..?.' >.- .'. 
SUZANNE MARELi 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETV.- • 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 






IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COTUT 
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LINDA KAY CLARK, 
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ainrr: 
I Kil l I I II ili"i|k 
D e f e n d a n t 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case Ni - 4244 DA 
Judge:!. Dennis Frederick 
-00O00-
The above-entitled matter came before the Court; :-.-•. i! on A ugiist h^ 
Honor r j - i - - ; - j i,.„ .vi mil was present in person and represented by 
'.:JV- Suzanne Marelius. .« : : a^at was present in person and represented by counsel, Dean 
a Declaration of Marriage is made, that the marital assets would be jointly appraised and the 
•joinm<v. :jVv marriage existed, the Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received evidence, 
rewevvd ,. ... ncTeii: winj OLAIC I.\. 
cause appearing does make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court has considered evidence on the issue of whether the parties have met 
the requirements for a common law marriage set forth in the statute at UCA §30-1-4.5. The 
Court finds that the evidence establishes that the parties have met all legal requirements of that 
statute and should be declared married. 
2. On the common law marriage elements, the Court finds that the evidence 
establishes the following: 
a. Both parties to this action are of legal age and capable of giving consent 
to a marital relationship; 
b. The parties to this action are both legally capable of entering into a 
solemnized marriage and in fact were previously married and divorce from one another by 
Decree entered in the Third Judicial Court of Summit County, State of Utah on or about August 
27, 1985; 
c. The parties to this action have cohabited and the Court finds that 
cohabitation to have commenced on or about October 1, 1985, and continued until the final 
separation of the parties on August 28, 1996, when the Defendant changed the locks on the 
residence and Plaintiff relocated to a separate home; 
d. The parties to this action mutually assumed marital rights, duties and 
obligations in numerous ways which will be set forth elsewhere in these findings; 
e. The parties to this action mutually held themselves out as wife and 
husband, and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as wife and husband. Among the 
2 
evidence supporting this factor is the consistent filing of joint, married income tax returns with 
the federal and state tax authorities from 1985 through 1994 (this return was filed 10-1-95 and 
was the last tax return filed before the separation). 
3. The Court finds that the parties mutually assumed marital rights, duties and 
obligations and have acquired a general reputation as a married couple and relies on the 
following specific evidence established at trial: 
a. Within a few months of their formal divorce in 1985, the parties 
commenced cohabitation and consistently lived together until August 28, 1996; 
b. The parties built a home together in Coalville, Utah, shortly after resuming 
cohabitation. They later moved to Magna, Utah with their children and purchased a residence 
in 1988 on 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah. The parties lived in this residence together 
until the final separation and jointly maintained, improved, paid for and enjoyed the benefits of 
this home ownership; 
c. In late 1985, the parties resumed parenting their children together until 
they reached the age of majority or were emancipated; 
d. The Plaintiff retained the married name of "Clark" and used this 
throughout the period of cohabitation, with Defendant's knowledge and consent; 
e. The Defendant purchased a new set of wedding rings for the Plaintiff in 
1989 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 16); 
f. The parties established joint credit as a married couple would do with 
Sears and JC Penney's (Plaintiffs Exhibit 17); 
3 
g. The parties established and maintained joint bank accounts for several years 
during their relationship, in addition to having separate accounts. The Court finds that there was 
no formal distinction during the relationship of the parties as to whether joint living expenses 
were paid from separate or joint accounts, and that said funds appear to be entirely commingled 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, 7, 8 11 and 27); 
h. The parties filed joint income tax returns claiming the marital deduction 
from 1985 through 1994, which was the last return filed prior to separation. These returns 
reflect that all property whether titled in the separate or joint names of the parties was described 
as marital property and both parties shared the tax impact of rental income, depreciation, etc., 
on such properties without distinction (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5); 
i. During the relationship the Defendant established several businesses which 
were operated together by the parties. These included Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning, 
Mark and Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning, K & S Properties. The Plaintiff worked on 
a full-time basis in these businesses doing bookkeeping, payroll, tax filings, record keeping, 
scheduling, and other general office work. Plaintiff was not paid a formal salary for these 
services and testified that she was working towards the betterment of the family finances and to 
augment the value of joint businesses. It is clear that Defendant relied on Plaintiff's ongoing 
services in this regard and that these businesses are jointly acquired marital assets; 
j . During the relationship the parties acquired personal belongings together 
and acquired real estate together, including the marital residence, the family businesses, a lot 
on Skyline Drive, rental property in Draper and a four-plex. At various times during the 
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relationship these assets were titled either in the separate names of the parties or joint names, 
as circumstances arose; 
k. During the relationship in approximately 1991, the parties each prepared 
a last will and testament which were reciprocal documents where each party left all interest in 
their property to the other party (Plaintiffs Exhibit 14, 15); 
1. During the relationship the parties routinely introduced one another as 
"husband" or "wife" and in particular, Defendant would make this introduction with the Plaintiff 
when he hired new employees for his business. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Jon Nash, 
a neighbor and friend of the parties for five years and that he assumed the parties were married 
and did not know that they were not formally married until the time of their separation in 
December 1995 as credible and reliable evidence on the reputation of the parties as married. 
The Court finds the testimony of Lisa Hart, the girlfriend of the parties' son since January 19, 
1993, and who also stayed with the parties for about three (3) weeks to care for Kelly Clark, 
that she believed the Clark's were married, based on their conduct and representations to her 
until Mr. Clark introduced her to a "girlfriend" at a later time, to be credible and reliable 
testimony on the conduct and reputation of the parties as married; 
m. The parties acquired vehicles together and paid for these vehicles from 
both joint and separate funds. The evidence establishes that Defendant bought a new 1994 
Dodge Ram pickup truck on July 2, 1994, and that Plaintiff paid the $5,000.00 down payment 
from her separate bank account (Plaintiffs Exhibit 9) which was later repaid to her by the 
Defendant); 
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n. During their relationship, the Plaintiff maintained insurance coverage on 
the Defendant's 1994 Dodge truck and paid for this from her separate account (Plaintiffs Exhibit 
10); 
o. Shortly after the parties resumed cohabitation, the Defendant restored 
Plaintiff as the primary beneficiary on his life insurance policy on April 15, 1986 (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 12); 
p. During the relationship, the parties paid jointly on life insurance for 
Defendant's mother, Roberta A. Clark, which premiums were paid from joint funds Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 13); 
q. Even during the separation of the parties which began December 1995, 
during their period of cohabitation, the Defendant would on occasion stay overnight with the 
Plaintiff and paid her first and last months rent and separate expenses, such as car repairs from 
his own funds (Plaintiffs Exhibit 20); 
r. Throughout the cohabitation of the parties and as recently as May 1996, 
on Plaintiff's birthday, the Defendant sent cards expressing his love and affection for the 
Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Exhibit 21). 
4. The parties purchased a marital residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, 
Utah, in 1988. Upon purchase of this residence, it was titled solely in the name of Plaintiff, 
Linda K. Clark even though the home was purchased with the joint funds of the parties. It is 
undisputed that this was done to preserve the asset during Defendant's bankruptcy proceedings. 
Thereafter, the parties entered into a written agreement dated June 26, 1992, wherein they 
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agreed that Plaintiff would Quit Claim her entire equity and interest in the residence to 
Defendant for the sum of $22,500.00 payable in installments of $300.00 per month. The parties 
both testified that Defendant came up with this number based on his own opinion that the home 
was worth approximately $50,000.00 and that this was a fair value after the deduction of certain 
joint debts. The Defendant made payments under this agreement and often missed payments for 
as long as ten (10) months. In approximately June 1996, the Defendant made a balloon payment 
completing the financial terms of this agreement and Plaintiff executed a Quit Claim Deed 
transferring the entire property to Defendant. Plaintiff claims that she entered into this 
agreement under duress and pressure from the Defendant and that it was never intended to be 
a true agreement. 
5. The Court finds the Plaintiffs claims of duress and intimidation by the Defendant 
relating to the June 1992, agreement are credible and finds that the agreement is of no force and 
effect and is void. The Court finds Plaintiffs testimony credible that she would receive the 
$300.00 payments and would routinely deposit those either in the parties joint account or her 
separate account or otherwise use those funds directly for the regular joint expenses of the 
parties such as groceries. The Court finds Plaintiff to be a timid, unassertive individual who 
could be easily pressured to enter into such an agreement by the Defendant. The Court finds 
Defendant to be overbearing and capable of intimidation towards the Plaintiff. The Court finds 
credible the testimony of the parties' son, Kelly Clark that the Defendant is intimidating and 
would routinely take advantage of individuals for financial gain. The Court finds clear and 
convincing evidence that Plaintiff felt compelled to sign this deed and did not have a full and 
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fair opportunity to consult counsel or otherwise reflect on the consequences of her actions. The 
deed was prepared by Attorney Nolan Olsen, who was the divorce attorney for Defendant and 
who, for many years, had been the Defendant's friend and business attorney. The Court finds 
that this was not an arms length, fair transaction and that equity requires that the Agreement and 
deed be set aside and given no force and effect. 
6. Based on the Court finding that the agreement dated June 26, 1992, is null and 
void, the Court also sets aside the Quit Claim Deed, dated April 10, 1996, by Plaintiff to 
Defendant, transferring her interest in the marital residence. The Court finds that the marital 
residence at 7492 West Jefferson Road, Magna, Utah, is a joint marital asset of the parties. 
7. The Plaintiff is requesting an award of alimony. The Court finds that Plaintiff 
is currently employed full-time earning $10.00 per hour, which is a gross monthly wage of 
$1,720.00 and that she has a net monthly income of $1,309.00. The Court finds Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 26 to be an accurate statement of Plaintiffs income and expenses and finds that 
Plaintiffs reasonable monthly expenses are $2,409.00 per month. Plaintiff has shown a need 
for alimony. 
8. The Defendant has testified that he is unaware of his current income. The Court 
recognized Mr. Clark's reluctance to testify as to what his current income is for purposes of 
alimony, which the Court finds to be troubling and not credible. The evidence has shown 
inconsistencies in Defendant's statements of his income depending on the purpose for which it 
is being made, such as an application for credit or for purposes of divorce. The Court finds 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 39, the Uniform Residential Loan Application a verified document completed 
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by Defendant, June 20, 1996, to be the best evidence of Defendant's current income and finds 
that income to be at least $5,376.00 gross per month. It is clear that during the recent 
cohabitation of the parties, they acquired considerable assets and have had a very comfortable 
style of living. Plaintiffs Exhibit 30, the loan application completed by Defendant states his net 
worth to be $477,118.00. It is clear that the Defendant has the ability to pay alimony. 
9. The Plaintiffs request for $1,000.00 a month for alimony is appropriate and the 
Court awards her that amount retroactive to September 1, 1996. Plaintiff is thus awarded a 
judgment against the Defendant for alimony accumulated during the twelve (12) months this 
matter has been pending, in the amount of $12,000.00. This judgment should bear interest at 
the legal rate of 7.45% per annum until paid. Defendant should commence making ongoing 
payments of alimony to Plaintiff effective September 1, 1997, which should be paid by the 1st 
of every month thereafter. Alimony will be payable to Plaintiff until such time as she remarries, 
cohabits, or until alimony has been paid for a term equaling the length of the marriage of the 
parties, or until Plaintiffs death, whichever event occurs earlier. 
10. Plaintiff has requested costs and attorney's fees. The Court finds Plaintiff has 
established a need for fees based on her income and that Defendant's income is more than twice 
that of the Plaintiffs and he has an ability to pay Plaintiff her reasonable costs and fees. The 
Court directs the Plaintiffs counsel to submit an Affidavit of Attorney's fees and costs under 
Rule of Judicial Administration, 4-501 and that Defendant may file any objection to that request, 
which the Court will consider under the terms of that Rule. 
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11. The Court finds that all property acquired during the marital relationship, which 
extends between October 1, 1985 and the date of the entry of the Divorce to be marital assets. 
The Court finds those marital assets to comprise at least the heating, cooling and insulation 
businesses operated by the Defendant, the marital residence on 7492 West Jefferson Road, 
Magna, Utah, the rental property at 12251 South 500 West, Draper, Utah, the four-plex rental 
property at 3667 South 3325 West, West Valley City, Utah, the trailer and lot on Skyline Drive 
in Sanpete County, the life insurance with a cash value on the life of Roberta Clark, the 
snowmobiles, 4-wheelers, and vehicles consisting of 1988 Lincoln, 1995 Ford pick-up truck, and 
business equipment and vehicles, the wedding rings purchased by Defendant for Plaintiff, the 
bank accounts and any and all other assets purchased during the appropriate time by both parties. 
The Court approves the parties stipulation that all assets will be appraised at the joint cost of the 
parties, with jointly agreed upon appraisers. Thereafter, the parties will mutually select and pay 
for a mediator or arbitrator to make a final division of marital assets between the parties. Both 
parties have agreed to be bound by the decision of that arbitrator. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to return to her maiden name of "Hammond." 
13. The Court finds that during the marital relationship of the parties, they 
encountered irreconcilable differences and that a divorce should be granted to Plaintiff to be final 
upon entry. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its Conclusions 
of Law: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Declaration of Marriage based on the finding that the 
elements of the Common Law Marriage Statute at UCA §30-1-4.5 have been met; 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences, said divorce to become final upon entry. 
3. The Court should enter such orders regarding alimony, division of assets and 
liabilities as are consistent with the Findings of Fact. 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this JO_ day of S> A^~ . 
1997, to: 
Mr. Dean N. Zabriskie 
Jamestown Square 
Hanover Building, Suite 370 
3507 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
S8V23417 ffc 
12 
SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LINDA KAY CLARK, : 
: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
CECIL E. CLARK, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 
: Judge 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff complains and alleges against Defendant as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and has been so for more than three months prior to the 
filing of this Complaint. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband and 
were married for 18 years prior to divorcing in 1985. A few months 
after the divorce, the parties commenced living together and have 
established a common law relationship since that date through their 
separation in September, 1996. 
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3. During the course of their common law marriage, the 
parties have encountered differences of an irreconcilable nature 
making a continuation of the marital relationship impossible• 
4. The parties have had two children together namely 
Kelly Clark born September 2, 1971 and Lisa Clark born August 1, 
1968. Both these children are past the age of majority. 
5. During the marriage the parties acquired a 
residence, real property and other improvements including 
furniture, fixtures and appliances at 7492 West Jefferson Road, 
Magna, Utah 84044. It is reasonable that the use and occupancy of 
this property be awarded to the Plaintiff until further order of 
the Court. 
6. During their marriage and common law relationship, 
the parties have acquired certain business interests, real 
property, personal property, vehicles and other assets and 
Plaintiff alleges that each party should fully disclose to the 
other the exact nature and extent of such assets and that the same 
should be awarded on an equitable basis between the parties, 
subject to any existing debt thereon, as determined by the Court. 
These assets should be divided pursuant to common law principles 
and alternatively under the theory of partnership^ contract for 
services or trust. 
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7. Since their marriage, the parties have incurred 
certain liabilities and obligations. Plaintiff alleges that each 
party should fully disclose the exact nature and extent of such 
debt to the other and that the parties should be ordered to assume, 
pay and discharge the same as determined by the Court. 
8. That during the pendency of the above-entitled 
action Plaintiff alleges that the parties should be restrained and 
enjoined from transferring, disposing of or changing the form or 
nature of assets, and from incurring any additional liabilities 
other than as may be mutually agreed to by the parties or otherwise 
ordered by the Court. 
9. That each of the parties hereto should be required 
to execute such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other 
documents and instruments needed to transfer the respective party's 
interest in and to the property awarded by the Court and title 
thereto. 
10. That the Plaintiff has retained the services of 
counsel in this action and should be awarded such fees and costs as 
are charged for services incurred in connection herewith. 
11. That the Defendant is currently employed as a 
business owner of "Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning", Mark & 
Sonny's Heating and Air Conditioning", among other activities which 
generate income, and it is reasonable that Defendant pay to 
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Plaintiff permanent alimony in such sum and amount as the Court 
shall determine. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That she be granted a divorce from the Defendant on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, said divorce to become 
final upon entry. 
2. That the Court enter such orders as are reasonable 
regarding support, and division of assets and liabilities as are 
alleged herein above. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
fair. 
DATED this day of 1996. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
3542 Candis 
Magna, Utah 84044 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
LINDA KAY CLARK, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes 
and says that she has read the foregoing Complaint for Divorce and 
knows and understands the contents thereof and the same is true as 
to her own knowledge except to those matters herein stated upon 
information and belief as to those matters, she believes the same 
to be true. 
DATED this 2-D day of ^3_ ^ ^ f ^ /(er? 
T 
, 1996. 
iffND^ KAY CLARK / 
L -YU-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA KAY CLARK, 
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vs . 
CECIL E. CLARK, 
Defendant. 
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2 I THE COURT: All right. I have done a number of 
3 these cases where there's a claim of common law marriage, 
4 since the advent of this statute which some may argue is 
5 ill-conceived, but nevertheless, our legislature has seen 
6 fit to legitimize common law relationships under certain 
7 limited circumstances, and since that time, I've had 


















I am persuaded that the overwhelming evidence is that there 
was a marital relationship post divorce of 1985, which, 
coincidentally, I granted. 
The persuasive, credible evidence is that within a 
matter of a few months of the time of that original divorce, 
which was granted in August of 1985, Exhibit 1, these parties 
were back living together as early potentially as October 
of 1985. They built a home together. They moved to a home 
in Magna together with their two children. They raised 
their children to the age of majority. They used the common 
last name of Clark. They drafted wills which while state 
they are separate individuals and single individuals, the 
content of the wills is that they leave to each other their 
entire estate, Exhibits 14 and 15. 
The defendant bought rings for the plaintiff, 
Exhibit IS. There was a joint use of credit accounts, 
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assumed the rights and obligations and duties of a marriage 
relationship, and lastly, held themselves out as husband and 
wife. At least, it was implicit in their relationship 
that they indeed were husband and wife. 
Consequently, I determine that there was a common 
law marriage up to the date of August of 1996, at which 
time then the separation, the final separation occurred. 
I am, moreover, of the view that the claim of 
intimidation, duress, overbearing conduct on the part of the 
defendant vis-a-vis the plaintiff here is a believable 
claim. 
Now, it may well be in the objective world, Mr. 
Clark's attitude and conduct is not such that one would 
find him to be overbearing or intimidating, but my observa-
tion of the respective parties here is that Ms. Clark, 
number one, is a person of considerable timidness, and I 
am of the view, therefore, that her execution of the deed 
incident to the Magna property was a situation she felt 
compelled to do, did not obtain independent counsel; 
indeed, used Mr. Olson who had been the longtime counsel of 
Mr. Clark and in fact represented him at the original 
divorce trial or stipulated divorce, and therefore find 
by clear and convincing evidence that she would not, but for 
these circumstances, have executed that deed for the sum of 
money that she received, that her will was overwrought, that 
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Consequently, 1 determine that it is of no force 
and effect with regard to her interest in that property. 
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and that her claim for alimony in the amount of $1,000 per 
month is neither exorbitant, nor is it in appropriate. 
I believe that she's shown a need for that and 
consequently award $1,000 per month in the form of alimony 
to terminate on the earliest of the typical conditions, and 
that that shall be retroactive to the month of September 
of 1996. 
In addition, I award to the plaintiff reasonable 
attorney's fees to be determined pursuant to Rule 4-501 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration. 
You submit to me an affidavit, and to Mr. Zabriskie 
likewise, Ms. Marelius, the amount of your fees, and then 
he will have the opportunity to object, and I will then 
rule pursuant to 4-501 on the reasonableness of the fees to 
be awarded here. 
The properties acquired during the course of this 
marital term that I have now defined are deemed to be and I 
consider them to be marital properties and therefore, the 
parties may and wil 1 submit the issue of distribution to 
binding arbitration as they have stipulated. 
Now, are there any questions? Ms. Marelius? 
MS. MARELIUS: My client would like to be awarded 
her name of Hammond, if v/e could add that to the Decree so 
it's clear. 
THE COURT: Insofar as this proceeding is concerned, 
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Consequently, decide that that wa.- * * the t- rmmat ica of 
the marriage. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License 
No. 22-106796-7801, and one of the official court reporters 
of the state of Utah; that on the 13th day of August, 1997, 
I attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the 
proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said 
shorthand proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, 
and the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 7, inclusive, 
constitute a full, true and correct account of the Judge's 
Ruling only, to the best of my ability. 




ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR 
iJTTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
426 SOUTH FIFTH EAST 
LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(801)531-0435 
DAVID E, LITTLE,FIELD 
FACSIMILE NO 
E. PAUL WOOD (801) 575••7834 
ANN L WASSERMANN 
SUZANNE MAREUUS AugUSt 25, 1997 
ARNOLD G GARDNER, JR. 
JAMES H, WOOOALL C R A I G M" P E T 'E RSON 
JANICE R. 01 SON (1942-1994) 
h I r, Dean Zabriskie 
H..mover Building, Suite 370 
Jamestown Square 
3507 North Univers 
Provo, UT 84604 
Pc- Clark v ™ < % 
D w : 
i:r. eiiv i.-sing herewith 'the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law am.1 a 
m of Marriage and Decree of Divorce, which, I have drafted in the above-matter. 
i iva5e review these and if they are acceptable, indicate your approval, as to form and, return them 
to me for filing in Court. 
ere is any question or problem with the content of any of these documents, please 
call ilk ;o discuss that. 
ould like • , JH ^. mat we select a red! , ... . -dibcib as soon as 
lease call me to discuss who you might have . i i : / r ^ks. I also would 
> be informed \\ ' .e f:\ M Clark will pay the $!2,i'KKi ^ arrears and the $1,000.00 in 
judgment for attorney's fees incurred in the pendency of this matter. Please have him make 
these payments through my office and if he will not be paying these as a lump sum,,, please 
communicate with me what payment terms he is proposing. 
I look forward to hearing from you. in 'this matter, 
Si i ieeu ' I ' i , 
I  I  I  I  I  I • I -I I -1 1) & PETERSON 
Suzanne Mini I in1 
SMrngp 
E n c l o s u r e ^ 
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JANICE R. OLSON ' l f l 4 * ' ^ J September 26, 1997 
The Honorable L Dennis Frederick 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South. #503 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re; Unda Kay Clark vs. Cecil E. Clark 
Case No.: 964904244 DA 
Dear Judge Frederick: 
1 am submitting the enclosed proposed Findings and Declaration of Marrjag^ pursuant 
trauie 4-304(2), Code of Judicial Admmistrationr i supplied a copy of these documents August 
Zo, 1997, to Attorney Zabriskie aiKl made numerous changes based on his comments, 
submitted revised copies September 10, 1997, for his approval as to form and he has not 
returned them to me approved or filed an objection. I presume the enclosed documents are thus 
acceptable. 
I ask iliac you review and execute these documents so they can be entered on the C ourt 
record. 1 am sending a copy of this letter to Attorney Zabriskie, notifying him that if he has 
further objections, he must file those in a formal matter with the Court. Thank you for your 
consideration. 
Respectfully, 
Ill I L l v H L u in. 'hTIRJmN 
Suzanne I lareli LIS 
SM.ngp 
Enclosures) 
cc: Dean Zabriskie 
Linda Clark 
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Salt Lake City, Utctu ci^o^ 
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Th^ Plaintiff's Morion for Contempt - "  - - -- o 
.sponses came before the „ _ L : C ..eaiin^ n 
:
 j
.-" 'onorable Commissioner Lisa Jones 
Plaintiff was oreserr prison and represent! 
-:. .; . not present nor was ^ , 
appearance mace by counse, n^ nis behalf. Counsel for Plaint ill 
proffered that there had been a partial "r?Dons- " the discovery 
.*..-'. _ . errogator ies, however. *e^ n no wr_, in 
responses to the Request for Production c : Documents :.c: v.-re :,: . 
docuTTtfcnts other than some tax returns 
1 
proffer, the Court record and file herein, the Court makes the 
following Findings and Recommendation for Court Order: 
1. The Plaintiff initiated discovery in October 1996, 
provided a reminder letter that responses were overdue on November 
26, 1996 and filed a First Motion to Compel which was scheduled for 
hearing March 6, 1997. That hearing was resolved by Stipulation 
and an Order entered April 7, 1997, requiring Defendant to comply 
with complete discovery responses by March 13, 1997, and pay fees 
of $250. There has been no compliance by the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff filed a second Motion to C^jnpel on 
March 20, 1997, and by the date of the hearing there had only been 
a partial, deficient response. The issue of Defendant's contempt 
for failure to abide by the Court Orders herein concerning 
discovery is hereby certified for evidentiary hearing. 
3. Based on the record of noncompliance herein, and the 
available sanctions set forth in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
37(b). The Defendant's pleadings will be stricken and his cfefault 
entered in the above entitled matter unless full and complete 
responses to the discovery served by Plaintiff are received by 
Plaintiffs counsel within ten days of entry of the order. 
4. The Plaintiff is awarded a judgment in the amount of 
$500 payable by Defendant which will bear legal interest at the 
2 
rate of 7.45% per annum until paid. This judgment arises from the 
attorneys fees required for the attorney's Motions to Compel. 
5. If Defendant's pleadings are stricken, Plaintiff may 
submit an Affidavit as to her current expenses and the Court will 
consider Plaintiff's request for a specific amount of alimony. 
DATED this _JftTaay of ML* , 1997 
HONORA£L£TJT.' DENNIS "^FREDERICK 
Diytr-ccw Court Judge 
RECOMMENDATION OF COMMISSIONER 
Commissioner Lisa Jones, having heard the above matter, 
herewith recommends that the foregoing Order be entered in this 
matter. 
DATED rffi^ day of April, 1997. 
J S A S C . JONES L I S A ^ .  
C o m m i s s i o n e r 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES, this / ^ f d a y of April, 19 97, to: 
Dean Zabriskie, Esq. 
Hanover Building, Suite 37 0 
James Town Square 
3507 No. University Ave. 
Provo, UT 84604 






























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA KAY CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
CECIL E. CLARK, 
Defendant. 
(Q 
Case No. 964904244 
HEARING, 8-31-98 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 31st day 
of August, 1995, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause 
came on for hearing before the HONORABLE J. DENNIS 
FREDERICK, District Court, without a jury in the Salt 
Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: SUZANNE MARELIUS 
Attorney at Law 
For the Defendant: MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney at Law 
CAT by: BILLIE WAY, CCR 
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1 but - finding that there is a marriage declared by 
2 law must be entered, if at all, within one year of 
3 the date of the separation of the parties or the last 
4 time that they cohabited together. 
5 I would point out that this matter came 
6 on for trial on August 14th, 1997, and the Court 
7 found that the parties separated for the final time 
8 on August 28th. The Court issued a ruling from the 
9 bench on this matter on August 14th, which gave 
10 plenty of time, two weeks, for an issuance of an 
11 order in this case, but the order --1 believe the 
12 certificate of mailing of the order indicates that it 
13 went to Mr. Zabriskie my predecessor Counsel, in 
14 September of 1997, and it was not entered by this 
15 Court until September of 1990 - 1997; as 
16 specifically it went to Mr. Zabriskie on September 
17 10th, and the order was issued on September 29th. 
18 It is our position that this Court went 
19 to some length to have a trial and to expedite the 
20 matter and to have that trial within the one-year 
21 statute, that there was ample time of two weeks after 
22 the issuance of the Court's ruling from the bench, 
23 that there was no order ~ proposed order submitted 
24 to this Court and, in fact, not until about two weeks 
25 after the applicable one year time period had 
Page 1 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: This is the time and place 
3 for the hearing on the Defendant's motion to dismiss 
4 in the matter of Linda K. Clark versus Cecil E. 
5 Clark, Case No. 964904244. 
6 Counsel, start your appearances for the 
7 record, please. 
8 MS. CORPORON: Mary Corporon for the 
9 Defendant. 
10 MS. MARELIUS: Suzanne Marelius for the 
11 Petitioner. 
12 MS. CORPORON: And we are the moving 
13 party, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Very well, Counsel. I've 
15 reviewed the respective memoranda both in support and 
16 in opposition to the motion. 
17 Ms. Corporon, you may proceed. 
18 MS. CORPORON: Thank you. This is our 
19 motion to dismiss, for lack of subject matter 
20 jurisdiction in this Court to issue the order which 
21 was issued declaring a common-law marriage as between] 
22 these parties and then ordering other relief as 
23 between the parties, that is for violation of Section 
24 30-1-4.5 requiring that any order finding a 
25 common-law marriage - and I use that term, I guess, 
Page 3 
1 expired. 
2 The case law in this State and 
3 specifically in Bunch v. Inglehorn (Phonetic) is very 
4 clear that it is not the date of filing, it 's not the 
5 date of trial, it 's not the date of the oral ruling, 
6 it is the date of entry of the order; and submission 
7 of the Proposed Order on September 10th is simply 
8 untimely. We've gone past our time period and within 
9 the holding in Bunch v. Inglehorn and the clear 
10 language of the statute is this entire action has to 
11 be dismissed at this point. The Court lost 
12 jurisdiction as of August 27th, 1997, to enter any 
13 orders finding or declaring a marriage in this case. 
14 I'll submit it. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, 
16 Ms. Corporon. 
17 Ms. Marelius? 
18 MS. MARELIUS: Your Honor, there are a 
19 number of legal, practical and equitable reasons that 
20 this Court should deny the motion to dismiss. The 
21 Court found this relationship by its findings in the 
22 disputed order ended August 28th, '96. We had close 
23 of evidence, bench ruling, minute entry, all occurred 
24 August 14th, within that one-year time period. 
25 We also sent, contrary to what Counsel 
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1 indicates, Proposed Findings and Decree to Counsel 
2 Zabriskie August 25th, again, within the one-year; 
3 and we've attached as Exhibit, I think, A and B to 
4 our Memorandum, my cover letter just to the Court of 
5 September 26th, saying that I sent the first draft 
6 August 25th, and then we also had our mailing 
7 certificate on the first draft. 
8 After a bench trial the Rules provide 15 
9 days for presenting opposing Counsel with the draft 
10 pleadings, that was done. There were revisions, 
11 changes requested. That was done. An then new 
12 pleadings were presented, and Counsel never sent them 
13 back. And so my transmit letter of September 
14 indicates that was the status. And based on that the 
15 Court did enter these documents September 29th, a few 
16 weeks beyond the one-year time limit. 
17 So, I think it is undisputed that the 
18 Court found all the elements of a common-law marriage 
19 existed after the 12-year relationship of these 
20 parties, which, in fact, came after an 18-year formal 
21 marriage. The Court essentially found that there had 
22 been no change in their relationship and actions 
23 towards one another. 
24 I would point out that the Petitioner 
25 also pled alternate theories in this case. We pled 
i Page 5 
i 1 partnership, resultant trust, constructive trust and 
2 equitable theories, which the Court did not rule on. 
3 We relied, the Court also relied, also primarily on 
4 the common-law theory. 
5 I think the prime fact of allowing the 
6 motion to dismiss would simply result in a new trial 
7 on these alternate theories. It would serve no 
8 purpose. And that would, I think, be at great cost 
9 to these parties. There is an appeal pending. They, 
10 of course, vested in that whole litigation process. 
11 That would cause another delay. And I think those 
12 things are equally prejudicial to both parties. 
13 We have filed a motion to enter this 
14 order nunc pro tunc, which I think is the practical 
15 equitable solution. That statute only does allow a 
16 Court, in matters of divorce, annulment and 
17 separation, to enter for a showing of good cause an 
18 order at a different date, and I would submit that 
19 date of trial three weeks earlier is the appropriate 
20 date that the Court should use to solve this 
21 problem. 
22 I think also under just the equitable 
23 authority of this Court, in domestic matters and the 
24 best interests of justice, that these parties are 
25 served by carrying out the ruling and findings of the 
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943 
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1 Court that the common-law marriage existed. 
2 I think it's also reasonable — another 
3 approach to this is to view Petitioner's filings as 
4 having complied with this one-year statute. There's 
5 two parts to the statute. The first part talks about 
6 entry of an order and the elements to establish a 
7 common-law marriage; the second part says that the 
8 determination or establishment of a marriage under 
9 the section must occur within one year of terminating 
10 the relationship. I don't think it is clear that the 
11 language "termination" or "establishment" means entry 
12 of an order. I think it can certainly mean 
13 everything that the Court did here at the close of 
14 evidence ruling, minute entry, that kind of a 
15 finding. So I think that's an open question under 
16 Utah law. 
17 The Bunch Case is distinguishable. It 
18 does appear to be the only guiding case we have in 
19 Utah, and that relates very specifically to the fact 
20 that filing a complaint for common law marriage 
21 within one year is not enough. That's all that | 
22 holding really relates to. 
23 I think another reason here, very 
24 significant, is that to enter a nunc pro tunc order 
25 - to not do that would allow Mr. Clark to benefit 
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l from this - the kinds of delays that I think were so 
I 2 frustrating to us at the time of trial. And I think 
3 the Court should be mindful of that. This is the 
4 case where we had two contempt orders entered. We 
5 had discovery served in October, motion for contempt 
6 in January that was granted, motion for contempt in 
7 April. Never had she responded to that discovery. 
8 April, the commissioner struck the pleadings, entered 
9 an order of marriage. That was not signed because 
10 there was a motion to set aside. But that bought 
11 Mr. Clark a six-month delay. We came into this court 
12 without complete discovery, and that's where we had 
13 this somewhat unusual order of having to do the 
14 appraisal and separation of property post-trial. 
15 The Petitioner in this case also tried 
16 very hard to get a ruling, a summary judgment, as it 
17 were, finding of the marriage. That was brought in a 
18 motion to the commissioner. The commissioner denied 
19 it, said there was an evidentiary hearing needed, 
20 that was recommended; the hearing was requested and 
21 denied. The Court wanted to do everything at the 
22 time of trial. So she certainly tried that. 
23 The third area of delay here, the final 
24 findings and decree were prepared and proposed before 
25 the one-year deadline and were simply held onto by 
Page 4 - Page 7 
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1 Counsel. Whether that was deliberate or not, I don't 
2 know. But it certainly caused significant problems 
3 in this case. 
4 So I think it is fair to say that the 
5 Petitioner complied to the best of her ability to be 
6 timely and complete and to complete this case in one 
7 year, and that would certainly suffice to establish 
8 good cause for the application of a nunc pro tunc 
9 order. 
10 One other area that I did brief, I'll 
11 just touch on it briefly, and that is the 
12 Constitutional issues. The Court of Appeals in Bunch 
13 Footnote 3 addressed this problem themselves, they 
14 could see it coming, that there was a potential equal 
15 protection violation under Article 24 of the Utah 
16 Constitution. The example the Court gave, and this 
17 would just be in the normal course of events, that 
18 this application of this one year deadline would 
19 deprive a party of their rights: 
20 "If a finding of common-law 
21 marriage was denied at trial, reversed 
22 on appeal, remanded, the parties could 
23 thus be denied the reasonable 
24 opportunity to have that common-law 
25 marriage determination within one year 
Page 9 
1 through no fault of their own." 
2 I think the case, as I've just discussed 
3 in the brief Mayland v. Lewis applies so well to this 
4 situation because it talks about the two types of 
5 discrimination that Section 24 guards against, that a 
6 law must apply equally to all persons within a class 
7 and if the classes are treated differently they must 
8 have -- based on differences that further the goals 
9 of the statute. 
10 In application, this one-year limit 
11 creates these two classes: It creates a class of 
12 people that can bring their case entirely within one 
13 year and those that can't. And I think the Court of 
14 Appeals has noted that the failure to meet that one 
15 year could be through no fault of the parties, it's 
16 simply inherent in the system we have. Discovery 
17 delays are common. Motions are common. The domestic 
18 relations commissioner system, itself, gives us many, 
19 many inherent delays. So I would submit no purpose 
20 is served by this arbitrary creation of two classes 
21 that can be justified, and there probably are some 
22 serious constitutional defects. 
23 I would urge the Court at this point to 
424 deny the motion to dismiss and enter this ~ just 
25 solve this problem by entering the order nunc pro 
Page 10 
1 tunc to the day of trial. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Marelius, 
3 thank you. 
4 Do you wish to respond briefly, 
5 Ms. Corporon? 
6 MS. CORPORON: Yes, Your Honor. After 
7 the request to issue a nunc pro tunc in this case, it 
8 is our position that once August 27th, 1997, had come 
9 and gone, this Court simply lost subject matter 
10 jurisdiction to do anything which includes a nunc pro 
11 tunc order. And it is our position that that 
12 deadline having passed this Court is lacking the 
13 jurisdiction and the power to issue the declaring the 
14 marriage. 
15 All of the constitutional arguments are, 
16 I submit, interesting academic arguments, but they 
17 don't apply to the facts in this case. It is 
18 absolute black letter law that courts do not reach 
19 constitutional issues if the issues can be resolved 
20 on non-constitutional, statutory grounds. 
21 In this particular case ~ and I wasn't 
22 participating in the original trial in this, but it's 
23 very clear to me from looking at the record that the 
24 Court and everyone bent over backwards to see that 
25 this trial came to trial before August 17. And it's 
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1 really clear in reading the trial transcript that 
2 everyone took a very brisk approach to the trial 
3 process in order to get this done on August 14th, 
J 4 1997, so that the Court could make a ruling. And so 
5 the Petitioner's claims and constitutional rights to 
6 get in here and have due process and to be heard by 
7 this Court were not denied to her, were not taken 
8 away from her, she was not treated differently from 
9 other litigants in this particular case. And if 
10 there's some potential for mischief in this statute, 
11 it didn't happen here because everyone was aware of 
12 this deadline and took measures, took appropriate 
13 measures to give the Petitioner a hearing. But then 
14 having had the hearing and with the Bunch v. 
15 Inglehorn Decision in 1995, some two years earlier, 
16 so that it's not some surprise sprung on everybody 
17 after the fact, the Petitioner waits until August 
18 25th to submit proposed documents by mailing and not 
19 to submit them to the Court. 
20 The presumption under Utah Rules of Civil 
21 Procedure is that if those things are mailed on the 
22 25th, they don't even get to Mr. Zabriskie, my 
23 predecessor Counsel, until August 28th, the three 
24 days later that would be presumed or allowed for the 
25 mailing process, which is a day later than the 
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1 deadline for entry of this order. The problem is the 
2 Petitioner didn't jump on the preparation of those 
3 documents, get them to this Court quickly so that 
4 Your Honor could enter them in a timely manner. And 
5 that's - that's not the fault of the statute, that's 
6 not the fault of this Court. And I would submit, 
7 Your Honor, that it is appropriate to dismiss this 
8 since the deadlines that are clearly enunciated were 
9 violated. Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: All right, Ms. Corporon. 
11 Thank you. 
12 It is particularly troubling to me to 
13 enforce specific deadline-type language in equitable 
14 matters such as domestic cases that are pending 
15 before me. The reason is because we are, by rule, by 
16 case law, expected to do equity in equitable matters 
17 of this nature. However, the legislature has, for 
18 whatever reason, determined that if these types of 
19 marital relationships, that is unsolemnized 
20 relationships, are going to be established, they must 
21 meet certain specific guidelines to be established; 
22 recognizing, of course, that prior to the advent of 
23 30-1-4.5, common-law marriages of this nature were 
124 not legally recognized. So, I suppose that when one 
25 is faced with what appears to me to be quite specific 
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1 language about the time frames in which this must be 
2 accomplished, then my mandate, of course, is to 
3 follow the language of the statute. 
4 It is my recollection that all recognized 
5 severity, the potential severity, of the imposed 
6 deadlines in this statutory scheme, and we did, 
7 indeed, move the matter along expeditiously to have 
8 the matter tried within the one-year time frame. And 
9 it was accomplished. And my rulings were made, 
10 albeit not reduced to writing, and executed by myself 
11 until the 29th of September, 1997, which is obviously 
12 in excess of one year from the date that I determined 
13 was the legal separation of these parties on August 
14 28th of f96. 
15 In the face of language such as, "A 
16 marriage that is not solemnized shall be legal and 
17 valid if a court order establishes such," and 
18 furthermore the language, "The determination or 
19 establishment of a marriage under this section must 
20 occur during the relationship or within one year 
21 following the termination of that relationship," it 
22 seems to me that there is little room for this Court 
23 to engage in so-called equitable innovation. 
24 Therefore, it seems to me that I am 
25 compelled by the language of the statute and the time 
BILLIE WAY, CCT 801-364-4943 
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1 frames applicable in this case to grant the motion to 
2 dismiss. 
3 And, Ms. Corporon, I will ask that you 
4 prepare an appropriate order in that regard. 
5 The fact that this matter is already 
6 pending on appeal may well facilitate an expedited 
7 ruling on the very issue that we are here dealing 
8 with today. I don't know that, but this is an issue 
9 that has not, other than the Bunch Case, which, if 
10 anything, seemed to me to establish that the 
11 appellate courts are going to look at specific 
12 enforcement language and see that it's complied 
13 with. But, nevertheless, it may well be that I 'm 
14 wrong. And if that is the case, then the matter is 
15 pending and hopefully it can get the appellate court 
16 to tell him so and we'll pick up the pieces 
17 thereafter. But in the face of what I 'm confronted 
18 with now, I think I have no alternative but to grant 
19 the motion to dismiss. 
20 MS. MARELIUS: Based on that, Your Honor, 
21 I would make a motion to stay this ruling pending my 
22 being able to file a motion with the appellate court 
23 to join this issue in the appeal. 
24 THE COURT: I don't know if there's going 
25 to be an objection, Ms. Corporon, from you about - I 
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1 don't really know what's happening in the matter in 
2 terms of these parties' relationship, anyway. 
3 MS. MARELIUS: I think the stay would 
4 relate to no one selling or transferring, disposing 
5 of marital assets. 
6 THE COURT: is there objection to that 
7 kind of an order? 
8 MS. CORPORON: The problem, Your Honor, 
9 is that Mr. Clark has been in significant financial 
10 difficulties and one possible remedy is for him to be 
11 able to encumber some of the real estate in order to 
12 borrow money to be able to pay some of the creditors 
13 that he has. But right now with being unable to sell 
14 the real estate, encumber it to perform repairs on 
15 it, do anything really imagined significantly, his 
16 hands are tied and he is collapsing financially. 
17 THE COURT: I think what I 'm hearing at 
18 this stage is that I 'm not prepared to take any | 
19 action of that nature, Ms. Marelius. You can present 
20 it to me in the proper format in the form of written 
21 motion to which Counsel can object, and then I will 
22 rule on it. 
23 MS. MARELIUS: Your Honor, will you give 
24 me ten days to do so -
25 THE COURT: I will grant you ten days in 
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l which to file your motion, and then I will respond as 
2 soon as I get a reply from you, Ms. Corporon. You 
3 will prepare the appropriate order? 
4 MS. CORPORON: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: All right. 
6 MS. MARELIUS: There will be no disposal 
7 or disbursement of property for ten days? 
8 THE COURT: Ten days, the status quo will 
9 remain in the effect. 
10 MS. CORPORON: Thank, Your Honor. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA KAY CLARK, : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 964904244 DA 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
CECIL E. CLARK, : Date: October 16, 1998 
Defendant(s), : 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit for Decision filed October 8, 1998 and Notice to Submit 
for Decision filed October 8, 1998, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Petitioner's Motion to Stay is granted, there being no 
timely opposition. 
2. Petitioner's Motion to Supplement, etc. and Objection to 
Order, etc. are denied. 
3. Counsel for movant to prepare the order. 
Case No. 964904244 DA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 16th day of October, 1998, I sent by 
first class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document 
to the following: 
Suzanne Marelius Mary C. Corporon 
426 South 500 East 808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
District Court Depdiy Clerk 
SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081) 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 




m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
LTNDA KAY CLARK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CECIL E. CLARK, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case No. 964904244 DA 
Judge: J. Dennis Frederick 
-ooOoo-
The Petitioner's Objection to Order Vacating Decree and Order of Dismissal; the 
Petitioner's Motion for Stay and to Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce having come before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, were reviewed and the Court issued a Minute Entry Ruling thereon. 
Based on the record and file herein, argument of counsel the Court makes the following 
ruling: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Petitioner's Motion to Stay the "Order Vacating Decree and Order of 
Dismissal" issued in the above-referenced matter is granted. Neither party is to thus take any 
action to sell, transfer, encumber or otherwise alienate or change the form or nature of assets 
of either party during the pendency of this case and appeal. 
2. The Petitioner's Motion to Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce and the Petitioner's Objection to Order Vacating Decree and 
Order of Dismissal are denied. i 
DATED this Mfrfa of JJL^ . 1998. 
BYtfflE 
Approval As to Form: 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Order, this J^_ day of X^CCUlWzC^ \W%, to: 
Mary Corporon 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
808 East South Temple 




30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be 
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out 
of a contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section 
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one 
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. ter 246, or the application of any provision to 
1987, ch. 246, § 2. any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch. remainder of the chapter is to be given effect 
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap- without the invalid provision or application. 
CHAPTER 4a 
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDERS 
Section 
30-4a-l. Authority of court 
30-4a-l. Authority of court. 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause and giving of 
such notice as may be ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter 
relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
History: C. 1953, 30-4a-l, enacted by L. 
1983, ch, 118, S 1. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Linda Kay Clark, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




CASE NO: 964904244 DA 
COMMISSIONER: 
Lisa A. Jones 
The Commissioner having received proffers of testimony and argument from Counsel on 
certain contested issues and having taken those contested issues under advisement, the 
Commissioner now makes the following findings and recommendations: 
1. COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: 
Plaintiff claims that the parties were married for eighteen years and in the almost 
twelve years since the divorce have had an identical relationship to that of a married couple. 
In 1992 plaintiff quit claimed her interest in the home in which defendant now lives for a 
$22,000.00 payment in $300.00 per month monthly increments with a balloon payment in May 
of 1996. Plaintiff now claims that to be an agreement entered into through duress. The parties 
filed joint tax returns in 1993 and 1994. 
Defendant responds that the parties were divorced in 1985 when there was a 
property division and admits the parties lived together but after 1992 had no marital relationship 
EXHIBIT A 
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and in fact made a division of their property in 1992 as evidenced by the payout for her share 
of the marital property. Defendant claims that the parties lived together from July through 
September of 1992, from January through March 1993, from July 1993 through April 1994, 
from May 1994 through September 1994, from March through October 1995 and for six weeks 
starting July 1, 1996. Defendant claims that the statute's requirement that she make a claim for 
common law marriage within one year has lapsed. Defendant married last August and is living 
in the marital home. 
The issue of the common law marriage is hotly disputed. Without an evidentiary 
hearing with regard to the factors for a common law marriage and evidence regarding when the 
parties were together and separated, the Commissioner cannot make a determination that a 
common law marriage exists. Without such a determination no relief plaintiff requests is 
possible. The issue of the common law marriage is a trial issue and the parties should move 
forward to trial. The issue of retroactivity with regard to the request for alimony is reserved 
as a trial issue. Plaintiffs requests for alimony, possession of the home and suit costs on a 
temporary basis are denied. The parties agree that the temporary restraining order should 
remain in effect and the Commissioner approves that stipulation. 
2, ORDER, 
Attorney for plaintiff should prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this day of November, 1996. 
LISA A. JONES 
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following, this /L"^ day of November, 1996. 
Suzanne Marelius 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Dean Zabriskie 
Thomas L. Low 
Attorney for Defendant 
Jamestown Square, Suite 370 
Hanover Building 
3507 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
I** THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LA2CS COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
CLARK, LINDA KAY 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
CLARK, CECIL E 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 964904244 DA 
DATE 07/01/97 
HONORABLE LISA A. JONES 
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE 
COURT CLERK GLN 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. MARELIUs, SUZANNE 
D. ATTY. ZABRISKIE, DEAN N 
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS: SET FOR TRIAL ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES, 
1. WHETHER COMMON LAW MARRIAGE EXISTS. 
2. REAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION. 
3. DEBT DISTRIBUTION. 
4. ALIMONY. 
5. ATTORNEY FEES. 
6. CONTEMPT. VIOLATION OF RESTRAINT ON ASSETS. 
COMMISSIONER'S S\JQCESTON FDR SETTLEMENT; 
1. THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS A BIFURCATED HEARING ON THE 
ISSUE OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE. THAT INITIAL HEARING WOULD 
TAKE 1/2 DAY hj? MOST. FURTHER, THE STATUTORY LIMIT ON 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARRIAGE IS LOOMING. THERE IS A SUB-
STANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SETTLEMENT ONCE THE ISSUE OF COMMON 
LAW MARRIAGE is DECIDED. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const. 1896. vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri- 26. 
